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1 The German Democratic Republic collapsed in 1989. But the legacy of one of its most
influential  institutions, the Staatssicherheitsdienst (Stasi),  is  still  present in Germany.
Jens Gieseke, who works as a historian in the so-called Stasi Archives, a federal institution
who preserves the records of the East German State Security and makes them accessible,
analyses  the  Stasi  as  a  part  of  state  and  society  in  the  former  German  Democratic
Republic. The book has eight chapters, five of them concentrating on the post-Stalinist
years  after  1956.  The  author  starts  by  describing  briefly  the  major  lines  of  the
development and the growth of the Stasi. The introductory chapter touches briefly upon
the  growth  of  the  Stasi  before  shifting  the  focus  to  the  «Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter»
(translated literally as ‘inofficial cooperators’). Gieseke calls them «denunciators of a new
type» (p. 108). The following chapter consists of an analysis of the Stasi’s control and
surveillance-system. The remaining chapters cover political opposition and resistance in
the GDR and the ways the Stasi handled this opposition, and – last but not least – the
activities of the East German State Security in Western Germany and in foreign countries.
In the final chapter of the book, the author describes the crisis and collapse of the Stasi
after October 9th, 1989. At the very end, he adds a useful annotated bibliography and
some statistical information on the East German State Security.
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2 After some incremental beginnings in the early 1950s, the Stasi became, starting in 1956,
sort of an all-purpose state enterprise for securing the state’s capabilities and power for
suppressing any political opposition (p. 17). In early 1956 the Stasi had 16,000 employees.
The  Stasi  doubled  its  personnel  every  ten  years  until  the  early  1980s,  reaching  a
maximum 91,000 full-time employees in 1989. That meant a ratio of one full-time agent
Stasi for 180 inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic (p. 70).  Gieseke sees the
instability and the lack of acceptance of the communist regime in Eastern Germany as one
of the reasons for the Growth of the Stasi, but the politics of détente in the 1970s were
perceived  as  threatening  the  German  Democratic  Republic,  resulting  in  increased
activities of the Stasi during the last two decades of the German Democratic Republic (p.
89).  The  Stasi  had  functions  far  beyond  those  of  ‘traditional’  political  polices  or
intelligence agencies. There are many indicators that the Stasi penetrated deeply into
many spheres of the society in Eastern Germany, although there is still a lack of studies
on the social and psychological effects the Stasi had on families, on neighbourhoods and
on work places.
3 The group of the Stasi’s top officers consisted to a large extent of communist veterans.
Most of them had taken exile in the Soviet Union and had returned in 1945. During the
almost forty years of the Stasi’s existence, the recruitment policies for filling the ‘rank
and file’of the state security were focused on young males from the East German working
class.  In the early years,  the Stasi had to tackle with a high turnover rate among its
members.  Gieseke  characterizes  the  many  «militant  class  fighters»  or  «Tschekisten»
(after Tscheka, the soviet secret police) among the Stasi officers (p. 18) as having a rigid
concept of the (Western) class enemy, and as having a moderate level of education only,
combining it with anti-intellectual and anti-bourgeois preferences (p. 101).
4 The Stasi conceptualized the class enemy, directed by Western forces, as exercising so
called «political ideological diversion», which was supposed to be virtually ‘everywhere’.
As a consequence, the Stasi collected enormous quantities of information and material,
which increasingly became unmanageable (p. 72), as the boundaries between important
and unimportant information were blurred increasingly (p. 137). Comparable perceptions
about ‘the enemy’  (coming from the East  this  time) and the presumed necessities  to
collect information about this enemy were seen as being relevant among some police
groups in Western Germany in the 1970s. This issue hasn’t raised much historical interest
yet.
5 Gieseke shows that many people, especially those showing an overall loyalty to the GDR’s
political  and  economic  system,  supported  the  Stasi  (p.  121).  But  he  nevertheless
underlines,  when looking at  the  numerous  denunciations  that  had occured,  that  the
willingness of ordinary people to cooperate and to denunciate wasn’t as pronounced as it
had  been  during  the  Nazi  period.  Altogether,  so-called  unpolitical  denunciations
prevailed during the GDR’s period (p. 117). The family has been relatively immune in that
context; information came mostly from neighbours, colleagues at work and other people
those to be researched met regularly, e.g. during sports activities (p. 157 f.).
6 Given the size of the Stasi, it would have been interesting to analyse the factors that held
such a huge organisation together. Was it mostly elitism? A look beyond the fence at the
new –  culturally  informed –  sociology  of  organizations  could  have  been  helpful.
Moreover, a turning around of one of Jens’ Gieseke’s central questions could lead onto
interesting  interpretative  grounds:  Why  ask  only  how  deeply  the  Stasi  was  able  to
penetrate East German Society and not how deeply East German society influenced the
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Stasi? One could take Gieseke’s study as a starting point for the social and especially for
the  cultural  historical  research  on  the  Stasi.  Future  research  would  benefit  from  a
comparison with other bureaucratic institutions.
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